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MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER IN WASHINGTON STATE
Hugh D. Spitzer'
Abstract: Local governments in Washington State have enjoyed strong regulatory powers
since the state's constitution was adopted in 1889. Those "police powers" initially focused on
the protection of public health and safety, but broadened in the early twentieth century to
encompass the protection of consumers and employees and the promotion of the general
welfare. The Supreme Court of Washington sparingly applied "substantive due process" as a
brake on the police power and promptly dropped that doctrine when the U.S. Supreme Court
ceased its use in the 1930s. However, the vocabulary of substantive due process lived on in
state court opinions defining the inherent nature and scope of the police power. Furthermore,
substantive due process has been resurrected as a constitutional doctrine in a narrow group of
land use cases-an unnecessary revival given the built-in limits on local regulatory activities.

This Article reviews municipal "police power" cases in Washington
State over the past century. The purpose is to help solve confusion about
the nature and extent of municipal powers and, specifically, the nature
and extent of police power-or regulatory power-as exercised by
general purpose governments such as cities and counties.' This Article
also traces the transformation of "substantive due process" vocabulary
into the fabric of police power doctrine, with concepts of "reasonableness" and a "rational connection" between governmental ends and means
defining the proper scope of regulatory activities. In Washington, those
parameters continue to define which actions are inherently within a
municipality's authority and which are ultra vires; even while the
substantive due process doctrine has died out nationwide, it lives on in a
narrow set of Washington land use cases involving egregious
governmental overreaching.
The need for a comprehensive examination of police power is
underscored by contradictory statements from the Supreme Court of
* Hugh D. Spitzer teaches local government law and state constitutional law at the University of
Washington School of Law, where he is an Affiliate Professor. He practices public finance law at
Foster Pepper & Shefelman PLLC.
This Article is dedicated to Professor Philip A. Trautman of the University of Washington
School of Law, whose thoughtful articles on municipal powers, written several decades ago,
continue to serve judges and lawyers today. Research for this Article was assisted by a grant from
the Ernest T. Falk Fund.
I. Special purpose governments also have limited regulatory authority when authorized by the
legislature. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 57.08.005(7) (1998) (authorizing water-sewer districts "[t]o
compel all property owners within the district ... to connect their private drain and sewer systems
with the district's system under such penalty as the commissioners shall prescribe").
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Washington concerning the scope of municipal authority in general.
Washington judges and lawyers often speak of municipal powers as
though they are a single body of authority.2 At other times, courts
distinguish between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities,
suggesting that proprietary powers should be construed more broadly
than governmental authority Some well-known Washington court
pronouncements on municipal powers failed to address adequately the
differences between distinct types of municipal authority and as a result,
are very much at odds. For example, in Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima,4
the court noted the "extensive powers" of first class cities as selfgoverning bodies, limited only by constitutional provisions and legislative enactments.5 In contrast, in Chemical Bank v. WPPSS,6 the court
referred to the narrow interpretation given a municipal corporation's
powers, limited to those expressly conferred or necessarily implied.7 The
failure to focus on the source of power under consideration and a
misunderstanding of the mode under which a local government is
operating in any given circumstance results in this confusion.
Forcing all municipal powers into a simple analytical rubric is often
misleading. In fact, there are four distinct modes of municipal
governmental authority in Washington-three substantive, and one
relating to government procedures for carrying out the other three:
1.

Police powers;

2.

Authority to provide general governmental services, such as
schools, parks, and fire protection;

3.

Authority to act in a proprietary capacity, usually in
connection with the sale of services or commodities through a
utility; and

2. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329, 339 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, 118
Wash. 2d 639, 645, 826 P.2d 167, 170 (1992); Hite v. PUD No. 2, 112 Wash. 2d 456,459, 772 P.2d
481, 483 (1989); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 698-99, 743 P.2d 793, 802-03
(1987).
4. 52 Wash. 2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958). In Winkenwerder, the court upheld Yakima's decision
to allow advertising on municipality-owned parking meters. See id. at 626-27, 328 P.2d at 879-80.
5. Id. at 622, 328 P.2d at 878.
6. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983). In ChemicalBank, the court voided intergovernmental
contracts that had provided the underpinning of financing for two nuclear power plants. See id. at
798-99, 666 P.2d at 342-43.
7. See id. at 792, 666 P.2d at 339.

Municipal Police Power
4.

Corporate powers.

Consequently, one must be aware of the mode of municipal authority
being exercised to understand the scope of the relevant powers and the
constraints on those powers. This Article focuses on local government
police powers, which upon examination appear quite broad in scope and
flexibility. By reviewing the evolution and the sometimes vacillating
history ofjudicial approaches to police power in Washington, this Article
is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the various kinds of
municipal authority and to help bring them into clearer focus.
Part I of this Article describes how Washington's founders entrenched
strong local government regulatory powers in the state constitution,
powers focused on the protection of public health and safety. Part II
depicts how, in the twentieth century's first four decades, federal
substantive due process doctrine temporarily delayed the expansion of
the police power, preventing governments from using this power to
protect workers and consumers. As discussed in Part III, that power
ultimately broadened, subject to constraints echoing the vocabulary of
substantive due process despite that doctrine's formal disappearance
from American constitutional theory. In Part IV, this Article reviews the
unique rebirth of substantive due process in Washington's land use law
and suggests that built-in constraints on the police power render it
unnecessary to resort to this constitutional doctrine to protect individuals
from overreaching regulatory action.
I.

FROM THE BEGINNING: REMARKABLY STRONG POLICE
POWERS

The police power of local government is, at root, the inherent power
of the community to regulate activities for the protection of public health
and safety. This is probably the oldest type of local government power.
As early as 451 B.C., Rome's Twelve Tables (an early code) contained
fire safety regulations such as set-back requirements, and water and
wastewater regulations intended to protect public health.' Blackstone and
others equated police power with the core of governmental activity: the
regulation of domestic order and the general governance of the
community.9 With the 1889 adoption of Washington's constitution came
an entrenched municipal police power provision in Article XI,
8. See Table VIL reprintedin Ancient Roman Statutes 11 (Johnson et al. eds., 1961).
9. See Ernst Freund, The Police Power:PublicPolicyand ConstitutionalRights§ 2, at 2 (1904).
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Section 11, providing that "[a]ny county, city, town or township may
make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and

other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."'" Nationally,
late nineteenth century municipal powers were constrained by the
"Dillon Rule," limiting local governmental powers to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied." However, even Judge Dillon noted the
particular strength of local government police, or regulatory, authority. 2
In Washington, the police power had been expressly granted to counties
and cities, fitting neatly under the Dillon Rule if applicable.
Early Supreme Court of Washington decisions reflected a strong-

police-power approach to Article XI, Section 11, of the Washington
Constitution. In City of Seattle v. Hurst,3 the City had prohibited the
solicitation of business from railway passengers as they disembarked
from trains. 4 Soliciting for taxi services anywhere within a railroad
station constituted a misdemeanor. 5 Nevertheless, the Great Northern
Railway Co. contracted with a private firm to help disembarking
passengers swiftly find cabs.' 6 Great Northern asserted a right to provide
services to its customers, particularly on its own property, maintaining
that the City's action impaired its right to contract. 7 The Supreme Court
of Washington rejected Great Northern's arguments, finding the
regulation reasonable and possibly necessary to protect passengers from
annoyance and confusion. 8 Given its facially legitimate purpose and
10. This section of Washington's Constitution was copied almost verbatim from Article XI,
Section 11, of California's 1879 Constitution. See Arthur S.Beardsley, Notes on the Sources of the
Washington State Constitution, 1889-1939, at 27 (1939). The provision now appears at Cal. Const.
art. XI, § 7.
11. See John F. Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations§ 237 (5th ed. 1911). The other
leading turn-of-the-century treatise on police power was Freund's The Police Power: Public Policy
and ConstitutionalRights. See supranote 9. Influential contemporary works on the nature and extent
of the police power included W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the
Decisions Relatingto the Police Power of the State (1900), and Alfred Russell, The Police Power of
the State (1900). See also Ruth Locke Roettinger, The Supreme Court and State Police Power
(1957).
12. Dillon defined police power as the "authority to suppress nuisances, preserve health, prevent
fires, to regulate the use and storing of dangerous articles, to establish and control markets, and the
like." Dillon, supranote 11, § 301.
13. 50 Wash. 424, 97 P. 454 (1908).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See id. at 425, 97 P. at 454.
See id.
See id. at 426-29, 97 P. at 455-56.
See id. at 429-30, 97 P. at 456.
See id. at 432, 97 P. at 457.

Municipal Police Power
reasonable connection to protecting the public, the court held that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. 9 The court further held
that the railroad could not enter into a contract nullifying the provisions
of a legitimate ordinance.20 The City's goal of protecting individual
travelers from harassment was deemed an appropriate public safety
matter for regulation.2 ' Therefore, in holding that an exercise of
regulatory authority was legitimate so long as it was meant to protect the
public health and safety and reasonably related to the sought-after goal,
Hurstwas a classic statement of local government police power.
Similarly, in Smith v. City of Spokane,' the court in 1909 upheld the
broad powers of a city to regulate garbage-collecting, even if doing so
had the effect of putting an existing enterprise out of business.' The
court noted that "[i]n all matters pertaining to the public health, nearly if
not the entire police power of the state is vested in municipal
corporations of the first class."24 Indeed, the court deemed city authority
over the garbage business strong enough to permit overt racism against
Japanese-American garbage haulers in Cornelius v. City of Seattle,' and
later to block a construction debris company's operations in City of
Spokane v. Carlson.26
Two other early cases elucidate the doctrine of strong local police
powers in the interest of public health and safety. Shepard v. City of
Seattle,27 in 1910, involved an unsuccessful challenge to Seattle's
requirement that all private hospitals and sanitariums connect to the
public sewers.2" The ordinance also required such facilities, prior to
operation, to gain the permission of adjacent property owners.2 9 The
court found that a prohibition on establishing private hospitals in
localities that might exacerbate the spread of contagious disease was a
19. See id.at 432-33, 97 P. at 457.

20. See id.at 433, 97 P. at 457.
21. See id at 432, 97 P. at 457; see also City of Seattle v. McConahy, 86 Wash. App. 557, 56567, 937 P.2d 1133, 1138-39 (1997) (upholding Seattle's authority under Article XI, Section 11, to
ban sitting on sidewalks in the interest of pedestrian safety).
22. 55 Wash. 219, 104 P. 249 (1909).
23. See id.
at 220-21, 104 P. at 250.
24. Id at 220, 104 P. at 250.
25. 123 Wash. 550,213 P. 17 (1923).
26. 73 Wash. 2d 76,436 P.2d 454 (1968).
27. 59 Wash. 363, 109 P. 1067 (1910).

28. See id.
at 373, 109 P. at 1070.
at 367, 109 P. at 1068.
29. See id.
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proper exercise of the police power.3" The court reasoned that because
mentally disabled inmates might annoy neighbors, the approval
requirement was legitimate.3 When opponents of the ordinance argued
that the measure was merely to placate those known today as
"NIMBYs,"3 2 the court replied:
If the ordinance is valid on its face, the reasons or arguments that
may have moved the city council to act are not pertinent here.
There are many unpleasant and annoying things that must be borne
by those living in a state of organized society, in order that others
may enjoy their equal rights under the law, but the preservation of
the public health and public safety is one of the chief objects of
local government, and every citizen holds his property subject to a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.33
In Detamore v. Hindley, 4 the court, in 1915, upheld Spokane's
authority to require and prescribe the method of grade separation when
streets and railways crossed." The court found this power an integral
aspect of a city's police power and held that the City had full authority to
control the method and location of railway construction.36 Importantly,
Detamore cited Article XI, Section 11, explaining the City's action as an
appropriate delegation of its police power "requir[ing] no legislative
sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, the
regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws."37
II.

POLICE POWER RETRENCHES, THEN BROADENS AGAIN

The Supreme Court of Washington had little difficulty upholding
ordinances protecting the physical health and safety of citizens or the
control of public rights of way. Yet, for a time, the court vacillated in its
approach to the regulation of workplace safety, consumer protection, and
business operations in circumstances not implicating the physical health

30. See id. at 373, 109 P. at 1070.
31. See id.
32. "Not In My Back Yard!"
33. Shepard,59 Wash. at 375, 109 P. at 1071.
34. 83 Wash. 322, 145 P. 462 (1915).
35. See id. at 327, 145 P. at 463-64.
36. See id. at 331, 145 P. at 465.
37. Id. at 326-27, 145 P. at 463.
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and safety of the general public. The court, like other state benches
around the country, was faced with a series of so-called "Lochner Era"38
cases restricting state and local regulation of business under the
"substantive due process" doctrine.39 These cases were foreshadowed by
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Lawton v. Steele,4° which in dicta
wrote that a "legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations." 4 The Lawton
Court stated that the U.S. Constitution's due process clause, applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited the exercise of
the police power except to the extent that exercise was required by the
public interest, used reasonably necessary means to accomplish a proper
purpose, and was not unduly oppressive.42
A decade later, in Lochner v. New York,43 the U.S. Supreme Court
used substantive due process theory to nullify a statute limiting the
number of hours that employees could be forced to work.' Reflecting the
traditional view that regulatory powers were to be focused on public
health and safety concerns, Justice Pecham wrote: "Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours
per day or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of the hours of libor
does not come within the police power on that ground."'45 While state
courts might have nullified wage-hour laws as not falling within the
definition or the inherent nature of police power, the U.S. Supreme Court
had no authority to make rulings on the quality or extent of state and
local powers. Accordingly, the national court was forced to base its
rejection on constitutional grounds, using due process as the convenient
doctrinal tool.
The Washington high court responded to Lochner. In 1906, in State
ex rel.Richey v. Smith,' the court cited Lochner in overturning a statute

38. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
152 U.S. 133 (1894).
md.at 137.
See id. at 136-37.

43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. See id.at53.
45. l at 57.
46. 42 Wash. 237, 84 P. 851 (1906).
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requiring journeyman plumbers to obtain licenses. 47 The opinion
emphasized the individual's right to work and the "vicious" and
"pernicious" nature of unnecessary regulations that did not protect public
health and safety, but instead fostered monopolistic practices. 4' The court
found no relation between the statute and the public health and
determined that it interfered with the liberty of citizens in direct conflict
with the Constitution.49 The court also overturned laws regulating the
horseshoeing business," imposing closing hours on meatpacking plants,5 '
requiring permits for street hawkers on private property,52 and restricting
barbershop operating hours,53 and the court also limited the scope of a
false-advertising ordinance. 4
Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, Washington State applied
Lawton and Lochner to restrict labor and economic regulation in a
limited fashion and only when constrained to do so by similar facts. Just
eight years after Lochner, in State v. Somerville,55 the state supreme court
upheld an eight-hour-day requirement for female workers.56 The court
shifted the burden to those challenging the statute, stating a presumption
of validity for statutes unless they "unquestionably and palpably"
violated a right secured by law." Significantly, the majority opinion
pointed to the rapidly changing social and economic conditions in the
state:
Circumstances and occasions calling for [the police power's]
exercise have multiplied with marvelous rapidity in recent years, by
reason of the well-recognized fact that modem, social and
economic conditions have called into existence agencies previously
unknown; many of which so vitally affect the health and physical
condition of laborers, and especially female laborers, that
legislation of the character here involved has been sustained with
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 247-49, 84 P. at 854.
Id. at 245, 84 P. at 853.
See id. at 248-49, 84 P. at 854.
See In re Aubrey, 36 Wash. 308, 317, 78 P. 900, 903 (1904).
51. See Brown v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash. 203, 216, 272 P. 517, 521-22 (1928).
52. See City of Seattle v. Ford, 144 Wash. 107, 114-15, 257 P. 243, 245 (1927).
53. See Patton v. City ofBellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 572-73, 38 P.2d 364, 366 (1934).
54. See City of Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293, 296-98, 48 P.2d 238, 240 (1935).
55. 67 Wash. 638, 122 P. 324 (1912).
56. See id. at 646-48, 122 P. at 328-29.
57. Id. at 642, 122 P. at 326.
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greater liberality than was formerly evinced under less exacting
conditions.5 8
The opinion first noted that Lochner had been approved by "a bare
majority of the judges" of the U.S. Supreme Court.59 Then the court
emphasized that the greater need to protect female workers than male
workers supported the work-hour limits for women.'
The Supreme Court of Washington took an even more aggressive
approach a year later in State v. Mountain Timber Co., 61 upholding a state
industrial-insurance law covering workers in hazardous industries.62

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Chadwick wrote a virtual treatise
on the evolution of the police power from Blackstone through Kent on
through the Slaughter-House Cases63 and into the twentieth century,"
Chadwick noted that while the "germ of police power.., is to be found

in the power of the state to suppress nuisances," that power was "not
confined to matters relating to the public health, morals and peace," and

government may interfere with private activities "whenever the public
interest demands it."' He cited a number of Washington cases showing a
"growth in liberal interpretation," and quoted City of Tacoma v.

Boutelle in noting a shift of the police power from the protection of
public health and safety toward the protection and promotion of the

58. Ia at 643, 122 P. at 326.
59. Id.at 643-46, 122 P. at 326-28.
60. See id The Washington Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908), had diverged from Lochnerwhen female employees were involved. See Somerville,
67 Wash. at 643-46, 122 P. at 326-28. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence
and the American ConstitutionalTradition, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1991). Siegel carefully demonstrates
that these cases were by no means lock-step and that the U.S. Supreme Court was itself divided in
various ways on the application of substantive due process theory to emerging social and economic
regulations. See id.
61. 75 Wash. 581, 135 P. 645 (1913).
62. See id.at 589-90, 135 P. at 649; see also State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash.
156, 178, 117 P. 1101, 1106 (1911) (upholding workers' compensation legislation and noting "when
reduced to its ultimate and final analysis, the police power is the power to govern" and states may
interfere with personal and property rights "when [a law] tends reasonably to correct some existing
evil or promote some interest of the state").
63. See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 11 U.S. 746 (1884).
64. See Mountain Timber, 75 Wash. at 584-85, 135 P. at 647.
65. Id,
66. 61 Wash. 434, 112 P. 661 (1911).
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general welfare.67 Summarizing the doctrine synthesized in Mountain
Timber, the opinion stated:
It will be seen that what was originally a rule of inclusion and of
exclusion and incapable of exact definition, has developed into a
rule of most frequent inclusion. From the peace of the community
and the suppression of nuisances, we have undertaken to regulate
things hitherto considered private.

The power has always been as broad as the public welfare and as
strong as the arm of the state.68
Mountain Timber is a reflection of Progressive Era concerns for the
public welfare, and a philosophy of community improvement and
protection that overwhelmed the residual nineteenth century laissezfaire
theories built into the Lochner-era cases.69 In the years following, the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld weights-and-measures regulation,70 prohibitions on trading stamps,7 ' closure of theaters and stores on
Sundays,72 regulation of gas station sites,73 and controls on cigarette
vending machines.74 In the 1930s, slightly ahead of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Washington Court faced the Lochner-type cases head on, first
upholding plumbers' license requirements75 and then sustaining
regulation of the baking industry.76 Finally, in Parrish v. West Coast
Hotel Co.,77 the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a state law
governing wages and working conditions for women and minors, despite
a challenge based on directly adverse U.S. Supreme Court substantive

67. Mountain Timber, 75 Wash. at 585-86, 135 P. at 647-48.
68. Id. at 587-88, 135 P. at 647.
69. See Richard Hofstadter, The Age ofReform 130-48, 174-78 (1955).
70. See City of Seattle v. Goldsmith, 73 Wash. 54,56-58, 131 P. 456,457 (1913).
71. See State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 615-16, 140 P. 918, 921 (1914).
72. See City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wash. 429, 432, 258 P. 328, 329-30 (1927); In re
Ferguson, 80 Wash. 102, 106, 141 P. 322, 323 (1914).
73. See State er rel. Lane v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 646, 648-50,225 P. 647, 648 (1924).
74. See Brennan v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 665, 668-70, 276 P. 886, 887-88 (1929).
75. See City of Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 332-34, 290 P. 1010, 1013 (1930).
76. See Continental Baking Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 182 Wash. 68, 72-73, 44 P.2d 821, 823
(1935).
77. 185 Wash. 581,55 P.2d 1083 (1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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due process rulings." On appeal, the nation's high court reversed course
and upheld the Washington decision, in part because of pressure from the
Roosevelt administration's court-packing scheme.79
Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court of Washington has generally

continued the strong-police-power approach that it had begun in the late
nineteenth century and had attempted to maintain despite the Lochner
cases. The court's opinions reflect the preexisting doctrinal support for
community self-regulation, the "decline of due process limitations and
consequent expansion of the police power,"8' a "more permissive view of

the due process clause,"81 and a reappraisal of the extent of the public
interest subject to police power protections.82 Courts have upheld a wide
variety of local regulations, including laws governing the operations of

private bus companies, 3 fluoridation of public water supplies," condemnation of private property for urban-renewal purposes, 5 emissions of

particulate matter into the air, 6 necessary screening around auto
wrecking yards, 7 employment agency activities and fees, 8 and the
operation of jet skis. 9 While cases have sustained a range of government

enforcement activities in the interest of the general welfare, a recent
Supreme Court of Washington case seemed to stretch the scope of the
police power well beyond the regulatory field and into the provision of a

78. See id.at 584-97, 55 P.2d at 1085-93.
79. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also Michael Ariens, A ThriceTold Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 628-29 (1994). The U.S. Supreme Court's
retreat from substantive due process is evidenced three years earlier in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934), which upheld controls on milk prices. A concise history of the rise and fall of Lochner
jurisprudence in Washington and the nation can be found in Petstel, Inc. v. King County, 77
Wash. 2d 144, 147-51, 459 P.2d 937, 938-41 (1969). See generally Roettinger, supra note 11;
Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (reprint from
VirginiaLaw Review vols. 27 and 28) (1932)).
80. Petstel,77 Wash. 2d at 148,459 P.2d at 939.
81. I
82. See id at 149,459 P.2d at 939-40.
83. See Evergreen Trailways, Inc. v. City of Renton, 38 Wash. 2d 82, 85-86, 228 P.2d 119, 121
(1951).
84. See Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616,620,277 P.2d 352,354 (1954).
85. See Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374,382-84,378 P.2d 464,469-70 (1963).
86. See Sittnerv. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 839,384 P.2d 859, 862 (1963).
87. See Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664,672,388 P.2d 926,935-36 (1964).
88. See State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 508, 816 P.2d 725, 733 (1991);
Petstel, Inc. v. King County, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 156,459 P.2d 937,943 (1969).
89. See Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash. 2d 678,693-94,958 P.2d 273,280-81 (1998).
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major public amenity. In CLEAN v. State," to block a referendum on
legislation financing a publicly owned major league baseball stadium, the
court had to find an emergency that justified action for "the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety." 9 The opinion asserted
that the Legislature was justified in concluding that the construction of a
publicly owned stadium was within the state's general police power."
This broad definition of the police power appears overinclusive and thus
not analytically useful.93 It remains to be seen whether an entirely
nonregulatory activity, such as baseball stadium construction, will be
viewed as an exercise of the police power over the long term.
III.

ONGOING CONSTRAINTS UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER

Despite the strong nature and expanding scope of the police power,
the Supreme Court of Washington has consistently limited the power's
exercise by its definition of the police power and by the inherent limits of
regulatory authority-not on an explicitly constitutional basis. At the
same time, the approach and vocabulary of these limits clearly reflect
their origins in a substantive due process doctrine that had, with one
notable exception, disappeared from the scene.
For example, in Patton v. City ofBellingham,94 the court in 1934 held
that the police power permitted inspection of barber shops, but could not
restrict the hours that tonsorial enterprises remained open.95 The court
rejected the notion that shops should close early so that inspectors would
not have to work in the evenings. 96 However, the opinion pointed out that
both parties to the dispute had agreed that it was unnecessary to consider
the statute's constitutionality, given that the city was operating under its
police powers as conferred by Article XI, Section 11, of the Washington
Constitution. 97 The opinion stressed that "[t]he grant of police power to a
city carries with it the necessary implication that its exercise must be

90. 130 Wash. 2d 782, 804-06, 928 P.2d 1054, 1064-66 (1996), as amended Jan. 13, 1997.
91. Id. at 804, 807-13, 928 P.2d at 1064, 1066-69.
92. See id at 806, 928 P.2d at 1066.
93. See infra note 123.
94. 179 Wash. 566,38 P.2d 364 (1934).
95. See id. at 571,575,38 P.2d at 365-67.
96. See id. at 575-76, 38 P.2d at 367.
97. See id. at 570, 576, 38 P.2d at 365, 367-68.
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reasonable," and concluded that controls on operating hours bore no
reasonable relationship to the protection of the community's health and
general welfare." Although the court rejected a constitutional basis for
the decision, it had silently incorporated the substantive due process
standard of reasonableness into the conceptual boundaries of police
power.
After the move away from explicit substantive due process in the late
1930s, the Supreme Court of Washington coupled ongoing support for
most police power measures with the doctrine that, by definition, those
measures must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some
interest of the state. Spokane County v. Valu-Mart,Inc." concerned "blue
laws" prohibiting the sale of major, but not smaller, household
appliances on Sundays."° The court found that while Sunday closure
laws were a legitimate exercise of the police power if meant to provide a
mandatory day of rest for all employees, the distinction between large
and small appliances was not related to any legitimate governmental
activity to protect public health and safety."° The court's opinion
provided a succinct explanation of the built-in limits to police power:
The police power is not plenary, but, rather, circumscribed with
sensible limitations. To be valid, a police measure must be
reasonably suitable for and appropriate to the attainment of such
ends as legitimately fall within the police power. Wide and
comprehensive as this power may be in promoting the public peace,
health, safety, morals, education, good order and welfare, the law
fastens upon it a salutary limitation that it must reasonably tend to
correct some evil or promote some interest of the state. If it be
invoked to 2achieve a legitimate end by reasonable means, it will be
0
sustained.1

98. IALat 572, 38 P.2d at 366. The opinion's author, Justice Steinert, was fairly conservative, probusiness, and inclined to support Lochner-style bans on commercial regulation. See Charles H.
Sheldon, The Washington High Bench: A BiographicalHistory of the State Supreme Court 1889-

1991, at 324 (1992). Accordingly, having stated that the court was not basing its decision on
constitutional grounds, he may have found it hard to resist slipping in language about the need for
local governments to respect constitutional rights of the individual in exercising the police power.
See Patton, 179 Wash. at 573-74,38 P.2d at 366-67.
99. 69 Wash.2d 712,419 P.2d 993 (1966).
100. See id.at 713-14,419 P.2d at 994-95.

101. Seeid at717,720-21,419P.2dat997-99.
102. Id at 719, 419 P.2d at 998 (citing Shea v. Olsen, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936)) (other
citation omitted).
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The classic "teaching case" on the limits to police power regulation is
Petstel, Inc. v. King County. 3 In 1969, Petstel upheld a King County
resolution fixing maximum rates charged by employment agencies."
The plaintiff had asserted that the regulations violated the due process
clauses of the U.S. and Washington Constitutions. 5 The court's opinion,
by the respected Justice Marshall Neill, first reviewed the history and
decline of due process limits on state regulation." 6 Justice Neill then
reiterated the traditional rule that where facts justifying the legislation
were reasonably conceivable, courts would presume the existence of
those facts and the presume that the legislation passed for that purpose.'0 7
Finally, the opinion outlined the following four tests that a regulatory
measure must meet to pass the judicial test of reasonableness:
First, any legislation under the police power must be reasonably
necessary in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, and the
general welfare....
[S]econd,... the legislation must be substantially related to the evil
sought to be cured....
[T]hird.... classes of businesses, products or persons regulated, or
the various classes established within the legislation [must] be
reasonably related to the legitimate object of the legislation....
[F]ourth,... the rates set [must] be reasonable,
unnecessarily prohibitory and confiscatory."'0

and not

While Justice Neill consciously recognized the due process and equal
protection overtones to these tests,"°9 his language suggested that these
103. 77 Wash. 2d 144,459 P.2d 937 (1969).
104. See id. at 146-47, 152,459 P.2d at 938, 941.
105. See id. at 147, 459 P.2d at 938.
106. See id. at 147-51, 459 P.2d at 938-41. The opinion also stressed "at the outset that any
ordinance regularly enacted is presumed constitutional." Id. at 156, 459 P.2d at 943.
107. See id. at 154-55, 459 P.2d at 942-43.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 153-54, 459 P.2d at 942. The equal protection overtones of Justice Neill's opinion
can be traced to several earlier cases in which the Supreme Court of Washington relied either on the
Fourteenth Amendment or the no-special-privileges provision of Article I, Section 12, to restrict
local government regulatory authority. See, e.g., Ralph v. City of Wenatchee, 34 Wash. 2d 638, 641,
209 P.2d 270, 272 (1949) (holding that restricting nonresident, but not local, photographers violated
both provisions); State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 78, 83-84, 59 P.2d 1101, 1103, 110506 (1936) (holding that restricting fishing licenses to persons who previously held them violated
both Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 12), overruled on other grounds by Puget Sound
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restrictions were themselves inherent in the scope of the authority of the
police power under Article XI, Section 11. He noted that under
Washington's Constitution, cities and counties had been delegated as
extensive a range of police powers as the state legislature, so long as the
subject matter is local, the regulation is reasonable, and the exercise of

authority does not conflict with general laws.' 10
While the Petstel tests have been followed with a fair degree of

consistency in subsequent Washington police power cases,"' those rules
do not provide the only constraints on municipal police power.
Generally, municipalities may exercise that authority only within their
boundaries." 2 Municipal police power may not be exercised for a
government's institutional self-interest, for example, solely to augment
the public treasury."'

Most important, and as explicitly stated in

Article XI, Section 11, a local government may not enact an ordinance
that conflicts with a state law intended to be exclusive on its face.1' 4 Yet,
in the field of police power, in contrast with governmental services
activities,15 the court has consistently held that a statute will not be
Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 947-48, 603 P.2d 819, 824 (1979); Exparte Camp, 38
Wash. 393, 397-98, 80 P. 547, 548-49 (1905) (holding that permitting local farmers, but not
itinerant peddlers, to sell fresh food granted special privileges or immunities in violation of Article I,
Section 12).
110. Petstel,77 Wash. 2d at 159,459 P.2d at 945.
111. See, e.g., State ex rel.Fault v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 504 n.25, 816 P.2d 725, 731
n.25 (1991); Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wash. 2d 564, 568, 663 P.2d 830, 832-33 (1983); Cougar Bus.
Owners Ass'n v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 477, 647 P.2d 481,487 (1982).
112. See Brown v. City ofCle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 589,261 P. 112, 112 (1927). Butsee Wilson
v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 69 Wash. 2d 148, 152-53, 417 P.2d 632, 634-35 (1966) (regarding
city's ability to deliver fluoridated water outside its limits).
113. See City ofTukwila v. City of Seattle, 68 Wash. 2d 611,614,414 P.2d 597, 599 (1966).
114. See City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash. 2d 106, 109-12, 356 P.2d 292, 294-97
(1960) (barring city law suspending drivers' licenses for drunk driving when preemption language in
state law was quite explicit); see also Snohomish County v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 646, 651, 648 P.2d
430, 433 (1982) (finding state construction of prison preempted local zoning); State v. City of
Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162, 167, 615 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1980) (determining that city was not
permitted to apply local historic-preservation laws against state university property); City of Yakima
v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 571, 94 P.2d 180, 183 (1939) (holding enforcement of antiloitering law
against strikers conflicted with state laws protecting labor organizing); State ex rel. Webstef v.
Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37,41-47, 120 P. 861, 863-65 (1912) (finding that city was not permitted
to interfere with state regulation of local telephone rates); City of Tacoma v. Franciscan Found., 94
Wash. App. 663, 665, 972 P.2d 566, 567 (1999) (holding city antidiscrimination law invalid to
extent it conflicted with exemptions provided in parallel state law). See generally Philip A.
Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporationsin Washington, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 743
(1963).
115. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772,666 P.2d 329 (1983).
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construed as taking away a municipality's power to legislate unless that
intent is expressly stated." 6 At the same time, when the Legislature has
not preempted municipal police powers but rather has prescribed how
they are to be exercised, the failure to observe statutory requirements can
7
be the basis for invalidating a local government's actions."
Although municipal police powers are established in the Washington
Constitution,"' the exercise of those powers is balanced by countervailing values entrenched in other constitutional provisions. For example,
in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,"9 an overriding concern for
the protection of the free exercise of religion trumped a city's power to
regulate land use. 20 Interestingly, the court seemed to split police powers
into two classes, those that are "compelling" in nature (concerning a
clear and present danger to public health, peace, and welfare) and those
that are appropriate regulatory concerns, but more likely to be
outweighed by other concerns such as the protection of individual
rights.' Although police powers expanded far beyond their limited
public health and safety roots during the past century,' the original

116. See State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Court, 92 Wash. 2d 106, 108, 594 P.2d 448,44950 (1979); see also Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 384, 617 P.2d 713, 719-20 (1980);
City of Seattle v. Wright, 72 Wash. 2d 556, 559-60, 433 P.2d 906, 908-09 (1967); Lenci v. City of
Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 669-71, 388 P.2d 926, 930-3 1 (1964); City of Seattle v. Long, 61
Wash. 2d 737, 740, 380 P.2d 472, 474 (1963); State v. Lundquist, 60 Wash. 2d 397, 400, 374 P.2d
246, 247-48 (1962); State ex rel.Isham v. City of Spokane, 2 Wash. 2d 392, 398, 98 P.2d 306, 30809 (1940); Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 35 Wash. App. 583, 587-88, 668 P.2d
596, 597-99 (1983).
117. See Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wash. 2d 550, 556, 304 P.2d 656, 660 (1956).
118. Seesupranotes 10-12 and accompanying text.
119. 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992).
120. See id. at 226-27, 840 P.2d at 187-88. But see Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County,
140 Wash. 2d 143, 995 P.2d 33 (2000). See generally Katie Hosford, Comment, The Search for a
Distinct Religious-Liberty Jurisprudence Under the Washington State Constitution, 75 Wash. L.
Rev. 643 (2000).
121. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226-27, 840 P.2d 187-88; see also Munns v. Martin,
131 Wash. 2d 192, 209-10, 930 P.2d 318, 326 (1997) (holding that free exercise of religion enabled
church to demolish building city desired to preserve for historic preservation); Miller v. City of
Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 385-86, 378 P.2d 464, 471-72 (1963) (upholding exercise of eminent
domain in urban-renewal area for protection of health and safety, but hinting that condemnation for
less urgent reasons might be rejected). But see Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19,
36-37, 578 P.2d 1292, 1301-02 (1978) (finding that exercise of police power outweighed argument
based on non-impairment of contracts).
122. See supra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
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group of regulations, for the immediate protection of the community,
may continue to enjoy a stronger status.12
IV. LAND USE: THE PECULIAR PERSISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The exercise of police powers in the land use area has been
longstanding and similarly subject to built-in constraints, but is
supplemented by a recent substantive due process overlay peculiar to
Washington State. Karasek v. Peier 2 provides an early example of land
use regulations. In 1900, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a
statute permitting the restraint of structures intended to injure a
neighbor's property." If protection of public health and safety was the
key to late-nineteenth-century police power theory, Karasek relied on
what might be seen as one of the foundations of the police power: the
prevention of nuisances. The court prominently quoted the maxim "Sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas"--"useyour property so as not to injure
the rights of others.' 126 Several years later, in Bowes v. City of
Aberdeen, 27 a property owner challenged a city's program of filling in
privateproperty to eliminate low, swampy conditions found dangerous to
public health.' Rejecting the landowner's takings challenge, the court
stated:
[I]t would be manifestly destructive to the advancement or
development of organized communities to put the public to the
burden of rendering compensation to one, or to many, when the
individual use is, or might be, a menace to the health, morals, or
peace of the whole community. These are the principal grounds
upon which the right to exercise the police power rests, and the
the present attempt comes
only question confronting us is whether
129
within these recognized principles.
123. See Miller, 61 Wash. 2d at 386, 378 P. 2d at 471-72 (making clear distinction, in eminent
domain context, between governmental powers to eradicate disease and crime and powers to effect
aesthetic improvements unrelated to public health and safety). But see supra notes 90-93 and

accompanying text.
124. 22 Wash. 419, 61 P. 33 (1900).
125. See id. at 425, 432, 61 P. at 35, 37.
126. Id at 426, 61 P. at 35.
127. 58 Wash. 535, 109 P. 369 (1910).
128. See id at 536-39, 109 P. at369-71.
129. Id at 542, 109 P. at 372.
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The court went on to uphold numerous exercises of municipal police
power to regulate the use of private property for public-safety reasons,
including controls over the siting of hospitals, 3 ' an ordinance requiring
changes to existing buildings to eliminate fire hazards,' city control
over location of gasoline sales,'32 prohibition and regulation of
dancehalls, 3 3 and the siting of helicopter pads.'34 In Hass v. City of
Kirkland,'3 5 the court found that even when a developer had a vested
right to a building permit, that right could be extinguished by the
exercise of the police power in the furtherance of public safety.136
The Supreme Court of Washington has also upheld zoning as an
acceptable exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety
and the general welfare. 137 In Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 3 ' the
court upheld city zoning restrictions on mobile homes, repeating the
standard formula of upholding the police power when there is a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, and when the legislation bears a reasonable relation to
accomplishing the municipality's purpose.'39 The court gave great
deference to legislative determinations of appropriate health, safety, and
welfare purposes. 40 The court then stated that the purpose of zoning is
not to increase or decrease the value of any particular parcel, but to
benefit the community generally through intelligent planning of land
uses without unreasonable discrimination. 4 ' The general purpose of
130. See Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 375, 109 P. 1067, 1070 (1910); supra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
131. See Coffin v. Blackwell, 116 Wash. 281,287-88, 199 P. 239, 241-42 (1921).
132. See Chief Petroleum Corp. v. City of Walla Walla, 10 Wash. 2d 297, 299-300, 116 P.2d
560, 561 (1941).
133. See Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 488-89, 269 P. 1043,
1044-45 (1928).
134. See Development Serv. of Am., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 107, 119-20, 979 P.2d
387, 393-94 (1999).
135. 78 Wash. 2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971).
136. See id. at 931-33, 481 P.2d at 10-12; see also supra Part II and relevant cases in last
paragraph of that Part.
137. See, e.g., Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566, 574-75, 520 P.2d 1374, 1379 (1974);
McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wash. 2d 659, 662, 414 P.2d 778, 780 (1966). The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld zoning against an earlier federal constitutional challenge in Village ofEuclid v. Amber Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-89,394-97 (1926).
138. 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
139. See id. at 26-27, 32, 586 P.2d at 865-66, 868.
140. See id. at 27, 586 P.2d at 866.
141. See id. at 27-28, 586 P.2d at 866.
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zoning, wrote the court, is to "stabilize uses, conserve property values,
preserve neighborhood characters, and promote orderly growth and

development."142
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Washington has not referenced
due process in most police power cases since the late 1930s. Instead, it

has prevented governments from overreaching in the use of that authority
by finding that certain actions are beyond the police power's inherent
scope. Although the conceptual boundaries of the police power set forth
in Valu-Mart143 and Petstel,'44 and repeated in Duckworth,145 clearly echo
the Lawton tests,"a Washington's high court has generally steered away

from explicit constitutional bases for its decisions. However, a group of
important land use cases is a notable exception to this general rule. In
those cases, the court has applied, to a limited extent, a federally driven
"takings" analysis restricting certain local government regulatory actions.
More importantly, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to
land use takings cases, the Washington court has resurrected a distinctive
substantive due process theory, catching the eye of commentators both
pro and con.' 47
The Supreme Court of Washington's reintroduction of substantive due

process as a constraint on local land use regulations was driven by
decisions of the nation's high court. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court
shook the then-prevailing assumption, existing since the late 1930s, that
the exercise of municipal police power would be relatively unhindered
by federal constitutional doctrines. In FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

kliat 28, 586 P.2d at 866.
69 Wash. 2d 712,419 P.2d 993 (1966); see also supranotes 99-102 and accompanying text.
77 Wash. 2d 144,459 P.2d 937 (1969); see also supranotes 103-10 and accompanying text.
91 Wash. 2d 19,586 P.2d 860 (1978); see also supranotes 138-42 and accompanying text.
152 U.S. 133 (1894); see also supranotes 40-42 and accompanying text.
147. A short but comprehensive description of Washington's idiosyncratic resurrection of
substantive due process in the land use area is presented in Norman Williams, Jr., How to Get
Around the Requirementfor Compensation in Cases of Invalid Zoning-The Washington Solution,
17 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep., May 1994, at 33. Williams' article is generally laudatory, but other
commentators have been critical of the Washington Court's approach to substantive due process.
See, e.g., Richard Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It Now You
Don 't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339 (1989); Patrick Schneider, Substantive Due Process Versus
the Legislative Role ofLocal Government, in 1994 Envtl. & Land Use L. Sec. Midyear Seminar, ch.
12; Richard Settle, Exploring Regulatory Taking Doctrine, in 1998 Land Use & Envtl. L. Midyear
Seminar, ch. 9; Susan Boyd, Comment, A DoctrineAdrift: Land Use Regulationand the Substantive
Due ProcessofLawton v. Steele in the Supreme Courtof Washington, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 69 (1999).
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Church v. Los Angeles County,148 the Court held that a county ordinance
prohibiting construction or rebuilding in a flooded area was
overreaching, destroyed any potential use of the subject property, and,
therefore, constituted a compensable "taking" under the Lochner-eracase
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 49 In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,5 ' the Court held that a state's attempt to force a land owner
to grant a public beach easement before obtaining a building permit was
a "permanent physical occupation" of private property by government,
and, in essence, an exercise of eminent domain requiring compensation.5 ' Yet, in the same year, the Court strongly sustained the exercise of
the police power against a takings challenge in a case involving
Pennsylvania's regulation of subsurface mining. That case, Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'52 was distinguished from
Pennsylvania Coal,'53 but could be seen as a rejection of that Lochnerperiod case in the modem context of environmental protection.
Nevertheless, FirstEnglish and Nollan commenced a new era of takings
cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court barred state and local
governments from using the police power to gain public benefits in or
uses of land through burdensome rules or regulatory blackmail."4
Washington State, however, diverged from the U.S. Supreme Court's
emphasis on takings jurisprudence and instead resurrected substantive
due process. In Orion Corp. v. State,'55 and then Presbytery of Seattle v.
King County,'5 6 the Supreme Court of Washington accounted for the
recent federal Supreme Court's takings cases, but revived substantive
due process in a manner echoing the Petstel police power tests, which
were clearly influenced by the vocabulary of the pre-1930s substantive
due process doctrine.
Presbytery involved an attempt to obtain damages by the purchaser of
wetland property on the ground that regulations restricting the develop-

148. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
149. See id. at 316 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
150. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
151. Id. at 831-32.
152. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
153. Id. at 485.
154. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
155. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
156. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
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'
The Supreme
ment of the parcel constituted a compensable "taking."157
Court of Washington held that the plaintiff had not shown that the
regulation denied all economically viable uses of the property. 5 ' The
case built on Orion, detailing the state's unique approach to analyzing
the interplay between the takings and the substantive due process
doctrines." 9 The court emphasized that the doctrines were alternatives in
situations involving allegations of especially severe land use
regulations."6 The court then prescribed a threshold inquiry as to
"whether the challenged regulation safeguards the public interest in
health, safety, the environment or... fiscal integrity,'' 6. in contrast to a
regulation that goes beyond preventing a public harm and actually
enhances a publicly owned right in property.162 The next test was whether
the regulation destroys one or more of the "fundamental attributes of
ownership-the right to possess, to exclude others and to dispose of
property."' 63 The court held that if a regulation does not infringe upon a
fundamental attribute of ownership, and if it protects the public from one
of the specified harms, there would not be any constitutional "taking"
requiring compensation.)"
Having set forth the basic test for determining whether there was a
constitutionally protected taking (a test that made it fairly difficult to
demonstrate a taking), the Presbytery court next brought in substantive
due process. Even without a taking, a regulation must still meet the due
process test of reasonableness. 65 The court recited a three-prong test,
remarkably similar to the Petstel tests for determining whether
governmental actions are by definition within a government's police
powers: "(1) [W]hether the regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate
public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary
to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the
landowner."'" Justice James Andersen's opinion restated the three-part

157. See id.at 325,787 P.2d at 910.
158. See id.at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915-16.
159. See id at 329-33, 787 P.2d at 912.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See idL at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.

Id
See id
Id at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912 (footnote omitted).

164. See id
165. See id at 330, 787 P.2d at 912-13.
166. Id (footnote omitted).
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test as follows: "1) There must be a public problem or 'evil,' 2) the
regulation must tend to solve this problem, and 3) the regulation must not
be 'unduly oppressive' upon the person regulated."' 67 Justice Andersen
seemed to admit that this third prong was not easy to apply, involving the
difficult job of balancing the public's and regulated landowner's
interests.' 68
In recent years, substantive due process has been reserved to a limited
number of Washington land use cases involving facts the court may have
seen as egregious exercises of governmental power, that is, situations
where the "undue oppression" leapt out at the judges. Three prominent
cases involved enactments seeking to shift unfairly to individual property
owners the responsibility of providing adequate housing for low-income
people,'69 which the court had earlier identified quite clearly as the
general public's burden. 7 ° In two of those cases, the court suggested that
local governments may have intentionally flouted the court's earlier
pronouncements, much to the disadvantage of aggrieved property
owners. 7' Consequently, the court was quite ready to permit the levy of
damages on the responsible public entities.7 In yet another instance, a
city council ignored the advice of its own attorney and proceeded to
contravene the vested rights of a property owner.'73 This action made it
easy for the Supreme Court of Washington to find the sort of
overburdensome exercise of police power, which warranted a finding
that substantive due process had been violated.'74
Because of the longstanding strength of municipal police power in
Washington and the state supreme court's historical reluctance to second
guess decisions by state and local decisionmakers, 75 substantive due
167. Id.at 330-31, 787 P.2d at 913; cf the Petstel tests, supranote 108 and accompanying text.
168. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330-31, 787 P.2d at 913.
169. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 611, 854 P.2d 1, 15 (1993); Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 59-60, 62-63, 830 P.2d 318, 333-35 (1992); Sintra, Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 776-77 (1992).
170. See San Telmo Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 25, 735 P.2d 673, 675 (1987).
171. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 53-54, 59-60, 830 P.2d at 329-31, 333-34; Sintra, 119
Wash. 2d at 22-24, 829 P.2d at 776-77.
172. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 79-80, 90, 830 P.2d at 344, 349-50; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at
29, 829 P.2d at 780.
173. See Mission Springs v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 965-66, 954 P.2d 250, 258-59
(1998).
174. See id.at 967, 954 P.2d at 259.
175. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 820, 928 P.2d 1054, 1072 (1996), as amended
Jan. 13, 1997 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Petstel, Inc. v. King County, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 154-55,
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process should continue to be confined to situations involving
governmental officials clearly acting in an arbitrary and high-handed
way, oppressing the regulated person. Indeed, it may not be at all
necessary to resort to a constitutional rationale for rejecting offending
governmental actions. In most instances, the court can follow the
doctrine, first voiced in 1934 in Patton v. City of Bellingham'76 and
reinforced in the 1960s by Valu-Mart 77 and Petstel, that inappropriate
and overreaching governmental actions are by definition outside the
scope of the police power, ultra vires, and therefore void. Because the
federal courts generally abstain from interpreting state laws, 7 the U.S.
Supreme Court usually must resort to a constitutionally based rationale to
overturn any overreaching actions by local governments. However, state
courts can and should reject overburdensome regulatory actions as
simply beyond the scope of the police power, following the general
principle that reviewing courts should abstain from considering
constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary. 8 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Municipal police powers in Washington State have always been
strong and continue to be vibrant. Cities and counties exercise as broad
an array of police powers as the state, subject only to situations involving
explicit preemption and the Petstel tests. Despite a quarter century
dalliance, the substantive due process approach was often avoided, and
then formally rejected in the late 1930s. Substantive due process has
been partially revived in a limited set of land use cases involving
459 P.2d 937, 942-43 (1969); Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 375, 109 P. 1067, 1071

(1910).
176. 179 Wash. 566,38 P.2d 364 (1934); see also supranotes 94-98 and accompanying text.
177. 69 Wash. 2d 712,419 P.2d 993 (1966); see also supranotes 99-102 and accompanying text.
178. 77 Wash. 2d 144,459 P.2d 937 )1969); see also supranotes 103-10 and accompanying text.
179. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,499-501 (1941).
180. See, eg., State v. Martin, 137 Wash. 2d 774, 788, 975 P.2d 1020, 1027 (1999); State v. Hall,
95 Wash. 2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101, 103 (1981). Restraining regulatory actions on Ponstitutional
grounds clearly will be necessary on occasion. The Washington Constitution grants the police power
to local governments. See Wash. Const. art. XI, § 11. This power is as broad as the State's regulatory
authority, except as may be limited by the legislature. Yet, since any state's powers are plenary, and
therefore limited only by the state or federal constitutions, it must be the case that only those
constitutions can demarcate the outer boundaries of governmental authority. Nevertheless, in almost
all situations, courts should constrain themselves to evaluating the appropriateness of regulatory
actions on statutory and definitional grounds, that is, on bases other than those constitutional in
nature.
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regulations the Supreme Court of Washington perceived as
overburdensome. However, the court could just as well have applied the
Petstel tests to reach the same results without reference to a
constitutional doctrine. This would provide adequate protection to
individuals without interfering with the community's long-held right to
enforce regulations for the protection of public health and safety and the
general welfare.

